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For decades air transport has been an industry managed exclusively by sta-
tes, in Europe and worldwide. States were the sole owners of both national air 
carriers (flag carriers) and airports, providing them with unlimited financial 
means. Also, air transport was highly regulated, i.e. limited in terms of traffic 
rights which granted the so-called “freedoms of the air” only to carriers from the 
state of arrival and the state of departure, respectively. Airport management was 
simply a reflection of exercising such rights by the carriers. Only in the last two 
decades, through creation of the internal market, air transport has been liberalised 
within the European Union (EU). These changes prompted a partial opening of 
the market of “air transport-related” services – first and foremost airport servi-
ces, at least the ones whose “nature” allows market opening. The International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has long published documents on the basic 
principles regarding airport services, as well as the charges paid by air carriers for 
such services. Not only did those principles become binding by their transposition 
into EU law, but they also enabled further changes, i.e. created a regulatory fra-
mework for partial liberalisation of such services. The application of competition 
law to air transport and related services, which were for such a long time known 
for strong state protectionism, has led to rich and extensive legislation by both 
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. Most recently, the 
Commission has published the Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines 
(2014/C 99/03), thus trying to create an adequate framework for the growing 
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number of air carrier business models and subsequent problems with applica-
ble law. Namely, the emergence of low-cost carriers, airline alliances as well as 
“hybrid” models (a combination of legacy carrier and low-cost carrier), combined 
with partial privatisation of airports, caused the applicable legal framework to 
grow as well, imposing obligations on the Member States to open their markets – a 
move which lead to various agreements between air carriers and airports, potenti-
ally incompatible with competition law. 
In this paper I will give an overview of the applicable legal framework on 
airport services provided within the EU, the stage of liberalisation of such ser-
vices and the reasoning behind such regulatory measures. Also, I will show the 
consequent evolution of the Commission’s guidelines on airport and airline state 
aid, focusing specifically on problems with the application of such framework in 
the Republic of Croatia, taking into account the volume of traffic and high seaso-
nality. Finally, I will try to find a reason for the recent failure in the attempt to 
change the existing regulatory framework for airport and groundhandling services 
and examine the potential consequences of these developments on further market 
opening in the so-called “aviation value chain” (supporting services by the air 
navigation service provider).
Keywords: airports, competition, air transport, groundhandling services, air-
port services, liberalisation, state aid
1. INTRODUCTION
Almost 20 years after the creation of an internal air transport market, civil 
aviation in Europe has changed in an unexpected manner. Airline industry is 
fully liberalised and probably more vulnerable than ever: the threat of carriers 
coming from completely different (and lot less regulated) markets, namely the 
Gulf carriers, is more “palpable” than ever: a highly debatable subject which 
might not even be a subject had there been clear and consistent regulations 
in the first place. Services provided at airports are regulated and divided ba-
sed on their potential provider, but amendments to the existing rules, aimed 
to clarify misunderstandings and loopholes in the text and take account of 
the most significant changes in the industry, were recently withdrawn by the 
Commission1 due to “no foreseeable agreement”.2 This turn of events, along 
1 European Commission, (2015), Communication from the Commission to the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: Commission Work Programme 2015 A New 
Start, COM(2014)910 final, Strasbourg.
2 Ibid., Annex 2, p. 14.
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with the stalling of the so-called “SES 2+” proposal3 aimed at liberalizing part 
of air navigation services, could have serious effects on future development of 
the EU air transport market and its global competitiveness. In order to find 
the root of the problems as well as potential solutions, it is necessary to have a 
deeper look into the regulatory changes during the last few decades. 
2. THE LONG ROAD TO THE COMMUNITY FRAMEWORK FOR CI-
VIL AVIATION
Every mode of transport in the EU has gone through significant regulatory 
changes in order to create a single common market. But these changes did not 
take place simultaneously. The Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (hereinafter: Treaty of Rome), signed in 1957, did not contain 
any provisions on air and sea transport. The reason for this was most probably 
strong reservations from the “original” Member States who were set on pro-
tecting their national carriers. Not only did the Treaty of Rome fail to regulate 
these two modes of transport, but it also did not specify whether the basic prin-
ciples of the common market are to apply – a fact which in the following decades 
caused substantial controversy and numerous debates regarding the creation of 
EU common transport policy.4 The question of applicability of the general pro-
visions of the Treaty of Rome to air and sea transport was not solved until two 
major rulings by the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: CJ or the Court). 
The French Seamen case5 was the first step towards establishing a common 
transport policy. Based on an action brought by the Commission against the 
French Republic, the CJ had to decide on the application of the Treaty pro-
visions on the freedom of movement of workers to sea (and subsequently air) 
transport. The Court concluded that the Treaty provisions apply to both sea 
and air transport, i.e. “that the general rules of the Treaty must be applied 
insofar as they are not excluded”.6 The Court therefore ruled that “the appli-
3 European Commission, (2013), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on the implementation of the Single European Sky (re-
cast), COM/2013/0410 final - 2013/0186 (COD), Strasbourg.
4 For more on the creation of the EU common transport policy see Radionov, N.; 
Ćapeta, T.; Marin, J.; Bulum, B.; Kumpan, A.; Popović, N.; Savić, I., Europsko pro-
metno pravo, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 2011, pp. 11 – 15.
5 European Court of Justice, (1974), Judgment of the Court of 4 April 1974, Com-
mission of the European Communities v French Republic, Case 167-73, European 
Court Reports 1974, 00359.
6 Ibid., para 28.
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cation of Articles 48 to 51 to the sphere of sea transport is not optional but 
obligatory for member states”.7
Although it seemed that the question of application of the Treaty to air 
and sea transport was answered, it soon became obvious that the term “general 
rules”, used in the French Seamen case, was quite elusive. Therefore another 
case appeared before the CJ (the Nouvelles Frontieres case8) where the French 
court asked for a preliminary ruling on the question whether the competition 
rules contained in Part III of the Treaty apply to air transport. The Court 
noted that only Article 61 of the Treaty, which states that freedom to provide 
services in the field of transport is governed by the provisions of the title re-
lating to the common transport policy makes its application to the transport 
sector subject to the realization of a common transport policy.9 So the conclu-
sion was that “the rules in the Treaty on competition, in particular Articles 85 
to 90, are applicable to transport”.10 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that 
if the Treaty intended to remove transport from the scope of the competition 
rules, it would explicitly have said so in its provisions. Additionally, the Court 
once again confirmed its judgment from the French Seamen case.11
The French Seamen and Nouvelles Frontieres cases12 created the perfect 
ground for what was coming next: the opening up of the air transport market 
through regulatory changes on the Community level. Having in mind that 
any sudden changes in the air transport sector could have profound social 
and economic consequences in the Member States, the Commission decided 
to go with the gradual approach: through three deregulation packages, each 
of them removing specific barriers to an open market from 1987 to 1992. 
The first step was taken through the adoption of two Regulations13, one Di-
7 Ibid., para 33.
8 European Court of Justice, (1986), Judgment of the Court of 30 April 1986 - Crimi-
nal proceedings against Lucas Asjes and others, Andrew Gray and others, Andrew 
Gray and others, Jacques Maillot and others and Léo Ludwig and others. - Refer-
ences for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de police de Paris - France. - Fixing of air 
tariffs - Applicability of the competition rules in the EEC Treaty. - Joined cases 209 
to 213/84, European Court reports 1986, 01425.
9 Ibid., paras 37 and 38.
10 Ibid., para 42.
11 Ibid., para 45.
12 For more on both rulings see Radionov et al., op. cit. (fn. 4), pp. 374 – 376. 
13 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down the pro-
cedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air 
transport sector (OJ L 374/87); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 De-
cember 1987 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories 
of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector (OJ L 374/87).
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rective14 and a Decision15 which enabled more flexibility regarding capacity 
on certain routes. Also, the first package allowed for multiple designation 
by a state, which meant access to various routes was available to several and 
not only one carrier. This prompted more private investments in the airline 
business and various types of commercial cooperation between carriers, for 
example interline and code share agreements, but also the creation of strate-
gic alliances.16 The second package17 came into effect in 1990 and paid more 
attention to pricing: greater freedom was introduced in the setting of fares 
and capacity-sharing. Also, all Community carriers were given the right to 
carry an unlimited number of passengers or cargo between their home state 
and another Member State. In other words, they were given unlimited third 
and fourth freedom’ rights18, as well as fifth freedom19 under certain con-
14 Council Directive 87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on fares for scheduled air 
services between Member States (OJ L 374/87).
15 Council Decision of 14 December 1987 on the sharing of passenger capacity be-
tween air carriers on scheduled air services between Member States and on ac-
cess for air carriers to scheduled air-service routes between Member States (OJ L 
374/87).
16 Knieps, G., Market versus state in building the aviation value chain, Journal of Air Tran-
sport Management, vol. 41, 2014, pp. 30 – 37. 
17 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares for scheduled air 
services (OJ L 217/90); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2343/90 of 24 July 1990 on 
access for air carriers to scheduled intra-Community air service routes and on the 
sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services between 
Member States (OJ L 217/90); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2344/90 of 24 July 
1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 on the application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air 
transport sector (OJ L 217/90).
18 International Civil Aviation Organisation, (2012), Manual on the Regulation of 
International Air Transport (Doc 9626, Part 4), Montreal: “Third Freedom of The 
Air – the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, granted 
by one State to another State to put down, in the territory of the first State, traffic 
coming from the home State of the carrier (also known as a Third Freedom Right).
 Fourth Freedom of The Air – the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled interna-
tional air services, granted by one State to another State to take on, in the territory 
of the first State, traffic destined for the home State of the carrier (also known as a 
Fourth Freedom Right).”
19 Ibid., “Fifth Freedom of The Air – the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled 
international air services, granted by one State to another State to put down and to 
take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic coming from or destined to a third 
State (also known as a Fifth Freedom Right).” 
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ditions. Finally, the third package20, as the last stage in creating a common 
air transport market, allowed Community carriers (carriers who were issued 
an air transport license by any Member State) to operate freely within the 
Community (free market access) along with free pricing. Division between 
scheduled and non-scheduled traffic ceased to exist and cabotage rights21 
were to be fully opened on 1 April 1997.
To truly allow liberalisation, changes needed to be made in the airport 
sector as well: just like carriers, Community airports were heavily subsidised 
by the states and if carriers were to compete freely, a genuine level playing 
field had to be created. So the Commission started preparations for further 
deregulation: the groundhandling market which, until the early 90s, consisted 
of airports and major airlines as the only providers of those kind of services.
It should be noted that during the late 80s the air transport sector saw 
strong growth and profitability which prompted the need for implementation 
of competition rules. Unlike today, airline business back then was blooming 
with an average profit margin of 3.0%.22 Unfortunately, this “golden age” was 
soon followed by a sharp decrease in demand, mixed with overcapacity as a re-
sult of aircraft orders placed during previous years. Last but not least, restricti-
ve bilateral agreements made it almost impossible to use this capacity on more 
potential markets.23 Taking into account that the United States deregulated 
their air transport market back in 1978, it is no wonder that European airlines 
suffered a much heavier blow anytime a specific event would influence a traffic 
demand. Political turmoil, severe weather conditions, economic collapse of a 
certain market is something most carriers know how to handle by simply using 
their fleets elsewhere. But if an airline has to do business within regulatory 
limits which leave no room for adjusting their business to world events and 
shifts in markets, they are practically doomed.
20 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air carriers 
(OJ L 240/92); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access 
for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes (OJ L 240/92); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for air services (OJ 
L 240/92). 
21 ICAO Manual Doc 9626, Part 4, op. cit. (fn. 18): “Ninth Freedom of The Air – the 
right or privilege of transporting cabotage traffic of the granting State on a service 
performed entirely within the territory of the granting State.”
22 European Commission, (1994) Communication from the Commission - the way 
forward for civil aviation in Europe, Bruxelles, COM(94)218 final, 1.6.1994, Brux-
elles.
23 Ibid., p. 6.
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In order to increase productivity and efficiency of European airlines, it 
was essential not only to go through restructuring but to, for the first time, 
acknowledge the problems within a wider area which contributed to their lack 
of competitiveness. For example, airport charges in Europe were, on average, 
three times higher than in the USA.24 The figures were also unfavourable when 
it came to charges paid for the air traffic control services (ATC charges) and 
with congestion-induced delays and waste of fuel.25 Subsequently, operating 
costs of European carriers were considerably higher than those of their coun-
terparts in the USA. Notwithstanding that these issues are first and foremost 
airline management issues, it was nonetheless crucial to recognize that a huge 
portion of airline costs consisted of services which were outside their control. 
In 1994 the Commission recognized for the first time that “public decisions on 
air transport infrastructure capacity and quality, as well as on rules concerning 
the use of such infrastructure will in future have to be based on a clear reco-
gnition of their impact on the overall efficiency of the civil aviation system”.26 
In other words, apart from the restructuring of carriers, it is essential to under-
stand that the only way they are to compete successfully in the global market 
is to have a healthy and supportive home market: without barriers and fully 
efficient. State aids can help achieve that goal if granted under strict and clear 
conditions. Therefore, the creation of a Single European Market in the civil 
aviation sector is much needed. The Commission firmly believed that, in the 
long run, “major conflicts of interest do not really exist”27 because every airport 
authority needs a strong and healthy airport user – especially a domestic one.28 
This paradigm is however only true to a certain extent: although European 
airlines and airports do share some common interests like the need to expand 
traffic numbers, on the other hand airlines are always competing with other 
airlines while airports usually have a dominant position and rarely compete 
against each other. The recent expansion of certain third country carriers has 
made this difference all the more visible: European carriers can hardly compete 
with foreign ones which are being subsidized by their countries – European 
airports, on the other hand, are more than happy to serve new players and 
couldn’t care less about their source of financing.
24 Ibid., p. 7.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 9.
28 Abeyratne, R., Law and Regulation of Aerodromes, Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland, Montreal, 2014, p. 131.
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The need for a Single European Market, as explained above, prompted 
the creation of the so-called “1994 Aviation Guidelines”29 on the application 
of competition provisions of the Treaty to state aids in the aviation sector. 
Although state aids in the past were mostly overshadowed by strong State 
intervention, now, with a deregulation framework in force, it was time to esta-
blish new rules and limit the use of state aids in air transport. Therefore the 
Commission said that it would “not allow further aid unless under exceptional 
circumstances, unforeseeable and external to the company”.30 On the other 
hand, the Commission was aware that additional factors needed to be taken 
into account: in order to create truly competitive European airlines, a sensi-
tive approach had to be taken. Airlines at that time were facing serious social 
and economic burdens which couldn’t be resolved merely by making better 
commercial decisions as of today. A majority of them were bound by collective 
agreements and huge aircraft orders which did not cater to the open market 
conditions. Unfortunately, for many of them, if they ever wanted to truly com-
pete in the market, state aid was inevitable. For this reason, the Commission 
conditioned this aid by making restructuring plans which could prove that 
potential aid would be compatible with the common market and acceptable to 
the market economy investor (“market economy investor principle”; hereinaf-
ter: MEIP31) meaning those which a “private investor operating under normal 
market conditions would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable 
private undertaking”.32 Another kind of aid which has been recognized and 
approved by the Commission was regional aid – provided that it is not used 
to cross-subsidize the routes on which there is effective competition betwe-
en carriers. The Commission therefore established clear rules for the “public 
service obligation” (hereinafter: PSO) as a part of the third package33: PSO 
can be established only for scheduled air services operating to a peripheral 
or developing region, or any other provided that it is vital for the economic 
29 European Commission, (1994), Application of articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State aids in the aviation sector (OJ C 
350/94).
30 Ibid., p. 7.
31 “The market economy investor principle will normally be satisfied where the struc-
ture and future prospects for the company are such that a normal return, by way 
of dividend payments or capital appreciation by reference to a comparable private 
enterprise, can be expected within a reasonable period.” (Ibid., p. 12).
32 Ibid.
33 See supra, fn. 20.
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development.34 The carrier serving such a region is chosen by a public tender, 
for a maximum period of 3 years and although he is entitled to compensation 
for such services, it cannot bring him any special benefit – otherwise it would 
constitute state aid.
Now that the legal framework for air carriers was established, further steps 
needed to be taken in order to achieve the aim of allowing freedom to pro-
vide services within the common transport policy, as well as creating a level 
playing field in the air transport market. The Commission prompted the Co-
uncil to broaden the existing regulatory framework with “the Groundhandling 
Directive”.35 It recognized that some of the airports’ services and facilities con-
stituted a monopoly by their nature (e.g. landing fee, which is essentially a fee 
for the use of runway), whereas others could be, and should be liberalized (e.g. 
catering services). On the other hand, the same approach should be used as 
with carriers, given the fact that airport services are also subject to strict safety 
and security rules and therefore, just like airlines, needed a gradual approach 
when it comes to market opening. Therefore the Groundhandling Directive 
recognized the provisional period until 2001. After this deadline, all the pro-
visions apply and they basically opened up the groundhandling market com-
pletely when it comes to self-handling (airport users providing groundhandling 
services for themselves) and third-party handling on all Community airports 
open to commercial traffic whose annual traffic is at least 2 million passenger 
movements or 50 000 tons of freight. There are, of course, exceptions to the 
rule for certain types of services (baggage handling, ramp handling, fuel and 
oil handling, cargo and mail handling), and in cases of capacity or space con-
straints which make the market opening impossible. Furthermore, since the 
airport managing body now acts both as a provider of services offered exclusi-
vely by them, which constitutes a monopoly (e.g. landing, parking, lighting, all 
charged through airport charges) and the provider of groundhandling services 
which are subject to market conditions, the Groundhandling Directive sets an 
obligation for airports to separate the accounts of their groundhandling activi-
ties from the accounts of their other activities. This way no cross-subsidizing 
would be possible and airport charges would be set on a clear cost-related 
bases while groundhandling charges would be decided on by the market. This 
34 There are 8 PSO routes in Croatia, currently served by Croatia Airlines and Trade 
Air.
35 Council Directive 96/67/EC of 15 October 1996 on access to the groundhandling 
market at Community airports (OJ L 272/96).
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kind of solution sounds good in theory but, as we will see in practice, is hardly 
applicable.
3. NEW CENTURY, NEW CHALLENGES
Profound regulatory changes and the 9/11 attacks in the United States led 
to a rise of the low cost carriers. Also called “no-frills” carriers, they grew very 
rapidly and profitably during the first decade of the 21st century. By 2009 the-
re were around 30 low-cost carriers in Europe36, taking larger and larger profit 
share from the existing, legacy carriers.
Apart from the “no-frills” business model, another important feature of 
these carriers is the aim to create a demand. Instead of operating from hub37 
airports and trying to compete with the biggest players in the business, a majo-
rity of low-cost carriers decided to turn to secondary and smaller airports and 
simply create a demand by offering cheap flights to other secondary airports. 
This kind of model could hardly work on its own – agreement with airport 
is needed, and if the airport in question is desperate to get more traffic and 
attract airlines, there is more chance of getting incentives for new routes, start-
up aid or other kind of help through various commercial agreements.
Recognizing these trends and trying to allow the development of new busi-
ness models (for both airlines and airports) while taking into account compe-
tition rules and recent disputes with major low cost carriers38, the Commission 
developed the “2005 Aviation Guidelines”39 on the financing of airports and 
start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports. Considering that the 
previous Guidelines from 1994 apply to the conditions for granting state aid 
to airlines, the 2005 Guidelines should be considered as an addition rather 
than a replacement. The document acknowledges the fact that the airports 
which were privatized are usually the ones making profit, while smaller airports 
36 Doganis, R., Flying off Course: Airline economics and marketing, Fourth edition, Rout-
ledge, Oxford, 2010, p. 133.
37 Hub is any airport which an airline uses as a tranfer point.
38 The Commission issued a Decision in 2004 regarding possible state aid to Ryanair: 
Commission Decision 2004/393/EC of 12 February 2004 concerning advantages 
granted by the Walloon Region and Brussels South Charleroi Airport to the airline 
Ryanair in connection with its establishment at Charleroi (OJ L 137, 30.4.2004, p. 1).
39 European Commission, (2005), Communication from the Commission — Com-
munity guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing 
from regional airports (OJ C 312/05).
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which continue to be publicly owned cannot compete with major hubs and can 
hardly influence the trade between Member States. Also, the impact of air-
ports to the local community in terms of education, economy and even health 
cannot be disregarded. Although, while providing this positive impact, airports 
cannot compete with high speed rail – the two services can only complement 
each other40 – a somewhat strange approach by the Commission considering 
the high number of subsidies involved in the rail sector. The Commission also 
makes reference to research showing that small airports rarely compete with 
other airports except, in some cases, “with neighbouring airports of a similar 
size whose markets overlap”.41 Furthermore, the Commission now stretches 
the principles of public service obligation to certain airport activities as well, 
saying that they could be regarded as services of general economic interest – if 
they pass the so-called “Altmark test”.42 As regards start-up aid, financial ad-
vantages given to certain airlines from airports’ own resources, would not be 
considered state aid if they were given under the same conditions like the ones 
given by private investors – which is usually proven by a sound business plan. 
When it comes to groundhandling services, and having in mind the framework 
set by the Groundhandling Directive, the 2005 Guidelines allow for airports 
under the 2 million threshold to cross-subsidize, but without including servi-
ces which it provides as an airport authority, i.e. recipient of public resources. 
Also, they should always have in mind the applicable competition rules on the 
dominant position and its possible abuse. However, when the 2 million pass-
enger threshold is reached, cross-subsidy is not allowed.
The principles set out in the 2005 Aviation Guidelines were strongly sha-
ken however when the European Court of Justice published its Judgment in 
the case Ryanair Ltd v Commission of the European Communities of 17 De-
cember 2008 regarding possible State aid granted to Ryanair through agree-
ments with the Walloon Region and the Brussels South Charleroi airport.43 
40 Ibid., p. 2.
41 Ibid., p. 3.
42 The CJ ruling on which four criteria have to be met so that the compensation for 
public service does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the 
EC Treaty (Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark [2003] European Court Reports I-7747).
43 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Eighth Chamber, extended composition) 
of 17 December 2008 Ryanair Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, 
Case T-196/04, European Court Reports 2008 II-03643.
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The Commission Decision44 which declared the reduction on airport landing 
charges granted to Ryanair at Brussels South Charleroi airport incompatible 
with the common market and therefore considered as state aid, was annulled. 
The Court found that the Commission failed to correctly examine the possible 
infringement of competition law by not applying the private investor principle 
simply because the Walloon region (the owner of Charleroi airport) is a public 
authority. The Commission took the view that it therefore cannot be regarded 
as an entity exercising an economic activity – which would then be subject 
to the private investor test. The Court however concluded that the state can 
indeed act as an undertaking operating as a private investor, in this case when 
managing an airport’s infrastructure. Needless to say, this ruling gave a strong 
boost to low-cost carriers and even caused new arrangements between them 
and secondary airports, often walking the fine line between sound business 
decisions and infringement of competition rules.
In the meantime, business at major hubs is going strong: the Groundhan-
dling Directive has “put down roots” and more and more undertakings have 
set up businesses at major airports. Some airport managing bodies have ceased 
to provide groundhandling services all together, and some have continued but 
now in the free market environment, i.e. facing heavy competition. Airlines 
did not stand still either: major carriers set up their own self-handling and 
therefore expand their business. The problem, in the context of competition, 
usually arises on those airports where the airport managing body continues to 
provide groundhandling services while at the same time acts as a monopoly 
in terms of providing airport services. This has usually happened in Member 
States whose national law stipulates that groundhandling services have to be 
provided at certain airports: an obligation which can hardly be imposed on pri-
vately owned enterprises like third party handlers, or expected of them at air-
ports with small traffic. In order to provide a clearer distinction between these 
two types of very different services from the provider’s point of view (one is 
liberalized, the other provided exclusively by the airport) a new Directive45 was 
published in 2009 (hereinafter: Airport Charges Directive). In this Directive, 
principles46 established long ago under the International Civil Aviation Orga-
44 See supra, fn. 36.
45 Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2009 on airport charges (OJ L 70).
46 International Civil Aviation Organisation, (2012), Doc 9082, ICAO’s Policies on 
Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, Montreal.
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nisation (ICAO) were given the power of EU law. The airport charge, “a levy 
collected for the benefit of the airport managing body and paid by the airport 
users for the use of facilities and services, which are exclusively provided by 
the airport managing body and which are related to landing, take-off, lighting 
and parking of aircraft, and processing of passengers and freight”47 should be 
calculated in a transparent, non-discriminatory and cost-related manner. This 
“pay what you use” principle is ensured by creating the Airport Users’ Com-
mittee, which regularly holds consultations with the airport managing body 
to ensure that all the charges are calculated in the above mentioned manner. 
Furthermore, and because user opinions are not binding, airport charges are 
approved by an independent supervisory authority48 which makes sure that 
the same principles are respected.
When it comes to groundhandling, the application of the Groundhandling 
Directive started to show results in strong growth of third party handlers which 
brought along lower prices, but unfortunately quite often also lower quality of 
the service. Changes which happened in the airline business (growing number 
of alliances, joint ventures and holding companies) needed to be addressed as 
the Groundhandling Directive did not foresee these kinds of business arran-
gements when it set the rules for self-handling 15 years ago. This called for a 
new legislative package, and this time the Commission decided to propose a 
draft Regulation, which would ensure unified application of the rules unlike 
the present differences in interpretation of the Groundhandling Directive.49 
The Proposal for a new Regulation50, which was part of the so-called “aviati-
on package”51, tried to address all the issues which did not even exist when the 
47 Directive 2009/12/EC, (fn. 41), Article 2.
48 In most EU Member States, the power of independent supervisory authority is 
given to the civil aviation authority. Only a few states have given this power to their 
competition authorities. Given the changes in the air transport market, it is to be 
expected that more and more Member States will delegate at least some of the tasks 
to their competition authorities.
49 For more on EU regulatory framework for airports see Diederiks-Verschoor, I., An 
introduction to Air Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012, pp. 
88 – 93.
50 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
groundhandling services at Union airports and repealing Council Directive 96/67/
EC, COM/2011/0824 final - 2011/0397 (COD). 
51 The Commission adopted in 2011 a comprehensive package of rules to tackle ca-
pacity problems at EU airports and improve services offered to passengers. The 
package contains three legislative proposals on slots, groundhandling and noise.
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Groundhandling Directive was adopted. In the context of this paper, the most 
important changes are the requirement of legal separation between the airport 
and its groundhandling services, which would ensure that the airport provider 
of the groundhandling services does not have any benefits from the airport 
– manager of airport services. This goes one step further than the Groundhan-
dling Directive, which has a requirement for airport managing bodies to sepa-
rate their accounts for the respective services. But even so, if the activities are 
legally separated, i.e. divided based on their nature and with a legally different 
provider, there still remains the issue of centralised infrastructure. This would 
refer to, as stated in the Proposal, “specific installations and/or facilities at an 
airport which cannot, for technical, environmental, cost or capacity reasons, 
be divided or duplicated and whose availability is essential and necessary for 
the performance of subsequent groundhandling services”.52 So, there is an in-
frastructure whose management constitutes a monopoly because it can only 
be done by one provider (the airport managing body) and is, at the same time, 
essential for providing groundhandling services – which are liberalised and 
open to several providers – one of which can also be the airport. To be able 
to call these services truly liberalised and to ensure the level playing field, the 
centralised infrastructure had to be managed in a most transparent, objective 
and non-discriminatory way – especially if the airport managing body is both 
in charge of centralised infrastructure and is one of the groundhandling provi-
ders competing with others for their market share.53 The Proposal accordingly 
left to the airport managing body to decide which infrastructure is going to be 
centralised, but only after a consultation with the Airport Users Committee 
and under the supervision of the independent supervisory body. The changes 
proposed would have created a much needed next regulatory step for the ope-
ning of the airport services’ market and contributing to competitiveness of the 
European air transport sector in general. Unfortunately, as stated previously 
in this paper, the Commission recently decided to withdraw the Proposal.54 
It was not only the groundhandling rules that needed a change. The last 
guidelines concerning competition rules in air transport sector were published 
in 2005 and a lot has changed since then – not to mention the Ryanair vs. 
52 Proposal for Regulation on groundhandling services, Article 2.
53 For more on the issue of non-dicriminatory access to central airport infrastructure 
see Knieps, op. cit. (fn. 16), pp. 30 – 37.
54 See supra, fn. 1.
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the Commission ruling by the CJ.55 In 2014 the Commission adopted new gu-
idelines56 on state aid to airports and airlines (hereinafter: the 2014 Aviation 
Guidelines), thus recognizing that the new landscape in aviation now consists 
of major hub airports, often congested and privatised, and at the same time 
numerous regional or secondary airports with their own market consisting of 
mostly low-cost or charter carriers. The 2014 Aviation Guidelines recognize 
the difference between airport activities which constitute an economic acti-
vity and therefore are subject to competition rules, and activities which are 
considered non-economic and are available for public funding without being 
in danger of constituting state aid.57 The biggest news is the introduction of 
the so-called “sunset rules” for operating aid; it is granted to regional airports 
for a transitional period of 10 years which should give them time to adapt to 
the market changes by gradually increasing airport charges and changing their 
business models altogether. The most important factor in allowing operating 
aid is a business plan which can prove that the airport will be able to cover 
their operating costs at the end of the transitional period. Start-up aid for air-
lines departing from airports with fewer than 3 million passengers per year, if 
allocated on a non-discriminatory bases, is allowed for a maximum period of 3 
years and the aid may cover a maximum of 50% of the airport charges.  
4. A FULLY OPEN INTERNAL MARKET: ILLUSION OR REALITY?
The present EU regulatory framework, as presented in this paper, has vario-
us effects on airports, depending on its size. 
Major hubs, who compete with other hubs, try to provide diversity of ser-
vices and thus attract as many carriers as possible. So far, most of the pro-
fit came from transfer and business passengers therefore demands from the 
biggest carriers had to be accommodated. The main focus was on creating a 
good product for a low price and facilitating the travel experience as much 
as possible. This means that there is usually strong competition among gro-
undhandlers and bigger carriers provide not only self-handling but also third 
party handling.58 The biggest concern for users is the fact that the airport 
55 See supra, fn. 41.
56 European Commission, (2014), Communication from the Commission — Guide-
lines on State aid to airports and airlines (OJ C 99/14).
57 For instance, air traffic control, police, customs etc.
58 Mostly to their alliance partners.
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managing bodies still provide airport services and handling services, or at least 
they get to choose the groundhandling providers – which creates a potential 
conflict of interest and possible abuse of dominant position. This is especially 
visible in the context of the so-called “access fee”, i.e. fee charged for access 
to centralized infrastructure, which is charged by the airport managing body 
and is supposed to be determined in a transparent and non-discriminatory 
way. Still, if one competitor is in the position to determine the conditions of 
market entry of other competitors, there is always going to be room for discri-
mination.59
As for smaller airports, although some of these rules do not apply to them60, 
they are still obliged to comply with competition rules, as well as separate their 
accounts according to the Groundhandling Directive. On the other hand, not 
all smaller airports are the same. Some have crucial roles in their community, 
providing connections to major hubs, boosting trade and the economy in ge-
neral. Others exist only because of social reasons and are no longer needed; 
unlike the times when all airports were publicly owned and subsidised, serving 
the equally subsidised flag carrier. Another common feature of secondary air-
ports is high seasonality and the ways to fight it range from establishing PSO 
routes during the winter to attracting major low-cost carriers by offering huge 
incentives and start-up aids on new routes. All of this, as seen in this paper 
and in accordance with the recent 2014 Aviation Guidelines, could subside in 
the years to come.
The obligation to separate accounts if the airport managing body provides 
both airport services and groundhandling services is especially challenging for 
smaller airports: not only do they not have the expertise and means to introdu-
ce sophisticated accounting systems, but they cannot generate enough revenue 
to see profit, or even break even, on both accounts. For them, cross-subsidizing 
could be a matter of survival and it shouldn’t be an issue, especially because 
an operator of a small airport is usually the only one providing any kind of 
service at the airport – from groundhandling to selling food and beverages 
to car parking. Major hubs experience more and more commercial revenue, 
59 For more on the issue on access fee, see Colangelo, M.; Zeno-Zencovich, V., Intro-
duction to European Union Transport Law, Edizioni Universitarie di Roma Tre, Roma, 
2015, pp. 47 – 55.
60 The Airport Charges Directive applies only to airports with annual traffic of over 
five million passenger movements and to the airport with the highest passenger 
movement in each Member State.
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allowing them to be generous with their incentives or keeping the airport char-
ges attractive enough. Small airports hardly have any commercial activities to 
cover the costs of their usually non-profitable aeronautical activities.
Besides, applicable safety and security rules impose almost the same bur-
den on all airports, regardless of their size in passenger traffic or revenue.61 
Another problem on the horizon, for both types of airports, is that the air-
line business is still changing: low-cost carriers are moving to major hubs and 
trying to attract at least a portion of business travellers, and legacy carriers 
are cutting costs and developing at least low-cost subsidiaries. From airports’ 
point of view, this could bring down the quality of service at major hubs while 
putting in greater danger the survival of secondary airports. The airlines would 
therefore like to have a say in choosing the handling providers by the airport, 
since the quality of this service directly affects their service. Also, given the 
number of alliances and consolidation of the airline business in general, they 
want self-handling to include alliances, joint ventures, holding companies and 
all other forms of cooperation, which makes sense for some of them, where the 
point of cooperation is to introduce a common, better product to passengers.
The same problem exists in Croatia where, apart from Zagreb International 
Airport, all other international airports are state owned, do not have traffic 
exceeding 2 million passengers per year and have a very strong seasonality 
problem. Although the EU law, as presented in this paper, is not always appli-
cable to airports with smaller passenger numbers, the core principles of these 
rules are still applicable through national law, not to mention competition law. 
High seasonality creates a demand for extra workforce and capacity in the 
summer, while in winter all these factors contribute to operating losses. To be 
able to create more traffic during winter, regulatory flexibility is crucial: air-
lines can be attracted only with significant incentives, marketing agreements 
and cross-subsidizing between regulated and non-regulated charges – at least 
until the numbers and profit go up significantly. In a country which has an 
airport with only, for example, 16 passengers in the first month of the year, 
putting any kind of regulatory burden on it in terms of competition seems not 
only unnecessary, but counterproductive.
The last issue is the creation of the Airport Users Committee, which is 
supposed to control the airport operator and make sure that every charge is 
61 JLS Consulting: John Strickland, (2015), Current challenges and future prospects 
for EU secondary airports (study), European Parliament, Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, Bruxelles.
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cost-related, non-discriminatory and transparent. Again, on an airport which 
only serves two operators once a week, what are the chances that they are go-
ing to spend their resources on this kind of Committee, which would consist 
of 3 people? The situation is not much different with other Croatian airports 
– users, i.e. carriers, are rarely interested in this kind of obligation on airports 
which is not their hub.
5. CONCLUSION 
Air transport is facing major challenges. Although the application of com-
petition rules is more than welcome, the “one size fits all” approach needs to 
be thoroughly revised. In terms of the airport business, one must seriously 
consider their role in the local, and even state economy before putting a heavy 
regulatory burden on them. Naturally, this does not mean their business sho-
uld not comply with competition rules, it simply means that these rules should 
be different – because the competition itself is different, sometimes even non-
existent – like with several Croatian airports. Rules on protecting rail against 
air should also be reconsidered, as well as traffic numbers as thresholds for the 
application of certain rules – having  2 million passengers per year does not 
mean that competition rules, in their present form, can be abided by during 
winter, or during summer for that matter. The Croatian coastal airports have 
seen a large traffic rise in recent years but it is highly debatable if that would 
be the case if they had not been able to offer operating aid to their carriers. 
Regulators should reconsider this kind of benchmarking because the passenger 
number on an annual level does not necessarily imply a reason for the applica-
tion of a heavier set of rules.62 
In order to improve the conditions of the sector and its competitivene-
ss, profitable players have to be subjected to strong competition rules while 
others should be given opportunities, within the legal system, to exercise their 
commercial freedom and improve business. One should keep in mind that, 
when it comes to air transport, their market is far bigger than Europe and the-
refore needs to be strong enough to be able to compete globally.
62 For a completely different proposal of the regulatory framework, suggested by Eu-
ropean Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA), see Peeters, M., The European 
Commission’s Airport Package, Air & Space Law, vol. 33, 2008, p. 260.
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Sažetak
 Ana Kapetanović *
LIBERALIZACIJA USLUGA ZRAČNIH LUKA EUROPSKE UNIJE: 
REGULATORNI OKVIR I PROBLEMI U PRAKSI
Zračni promet desetljećima je, kako u Europi tako i u svijetu, bio isključivo 
predmetom državnog interesa. Države su bile jedini vlasnici zračnih (nacionalnih) 
prijevoznika (tzv. flag carriers), kao i zračnih luka, te su i jedni i drugi uživali 
neograničenu financijsku pomoć. Uz to, poslovanje prijevoznika bilo je strogo regulirano, 
tj. ograničeno: pravo obavljanja zračnog prijevoza iz/u određene države pripadalo je samo 
zračnim prijevoznicima država između kojih se prijevoz obavlja, a poslovanje zračnih 
luka bilo je samo odraz korištenja takvih prava. Tek je u posljednjih dvadeset godina 
stvaranjem jedinstvenog tržišta potpuno liberaliziran zračni prijevoz unutar Europske 
unije. Paralelno s takvim promjenama u zračnom prijevozu donekle su liberalizirane i 
usluge koje “prate” takav prijevoz – prije svega usluge koje se prijevoznicima pružaju 
u zračnim lukama, a koje su po svojoj prirodi takve da omogućuju otvaranje tržišta. 
Aerodromske usluge, kao i naknade koje se za njih naplaćuju prijevoznicima, odavno su 
predmetom smjernica koje je izdala Međunarodna organizacija za civilno zrakoplovstvo 
(International Civil Aviation Organisation; ICAO). Navedene smjernice dobile su 
obvezujući karakter tek transpozicijom u propise EU-a, a navedenim zakonodavstvom 
otišlo se i korak dalje – stvoren je pravni okvir za otvaranje tržišta dijela takvih usluga.
Primjena prava tržišnog natjecanja na granu prijevoza i s njim povezane usluge, koje 
su toliko dugo bile obilježene snažnim državnim protekcionizmom, dovela je pak do bogate 
prakse Europske komisije i Europskog suda. Jedan od posebno bitnih dokumenata čine 
Smjernice o državnim potporama zračnim lukama i zračnim prijevoznicima (2014/C 
99/03), kojima se nastoji adekvatno odgovoriti na probleme u primjeni postojećeg 
pravnog okvira i činjenicu sve većeg broja poslovnih modela zračnih prijevoznika. 
Naime, pojava niskotarifnih prijevoznika, zatim alijansi te tzv. “hibridnih” modela 
(kombinacija klasičnih linijskih i niskotarifnih prijevoznika), kombinirana s djelomičnom 
privatizacijom zračnih luka i sve opsežnijim pravnim okvirom kojim se definiraju obveze 
država članica da otvore tržište usluga koje se pružaju u zračnim lukama dovela je do 
raznih vrsta ugovora između prijevoznika i zračnih luka i potencijalnog kršenja prava 
tržišnog natjecanja.
* Ana Kapetanović, dipl. iur., voditeljica Odjela zrakoplovnog prava i međunarodnih 
poslova, Hrvatska agencija za civilno zrakoplovstvo, Ulica grada Vukovara 284, 
Zagreb; ana.kapetanovic@ccaa.hr
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U ovom radu prikazat ćemo primjenljivi pravni okvir za usluge koje se pružaju u 
zračnim lukama EU-a, mjeru u kojoj su one liberalizirane, logiku takvih zakonodavnih 
promjena te prikaz postupnog prilagođavanja smjernica Europske komisije iz područja 
prava tržišnog natjecanja trenutačnoj situaciji i promjenama u načinu poslovanja 
zračnih prijevoznika i zračnih luka. Pritom ćemo se posebno osvrnuti na probleme u 
primjeni navedenih propisa na zračne luke u Republici Hrvatskoj, s obzirom na opseg 
prometa i visoku sezonalnost, te ćemo pokušati odgovoriti na pitanje zašto najavljene 
promjene u regulaciji aerodromskih usluga nisu uspjele i kako bi to moglo utjecati na 
liberalizaciju drugih usluga u tzv. “prehrambenom lancu” zračnog prometa (pomoćne 
usluge koja obavlja pružatelj usluga u zračnoj plovidbi).
Ključne riječi: zračne luke, natjecanje, zračni prijevoz, zemaljske usluge, usluge zračne 
luke, liberalizacija, državne potpore
